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The Federal Budget and
Stabilization Policy in 1968
-/ HE FEDERAL BUDGET and the Economic Re-
port of the President are presented to Congress and
the public earlyeach year. Together they can be view-
ed as a national “economic plan” in the spirit of the
Employment Act of 1946.i The purpose of this article
is to summarize and analyze the economic plan for
1968. Emphasis is placed on fiscal actions required to
achieve the goals of high employment with relative
price stability and equilibrium in the balance of inter-
national payments.
The 1968 national economic plan calls for a gross
national product of $846 billion, a 7.7 per cent in-
crease over 1967, consisting of 4.2 per cent growth in
real product and 3.4 per cent increase in prices. The
chief economic problem in 1968, as expressed by the
President’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), is
to restrain the increase in dollardemand for goods and
services to a limit imposed by growth in the nation’s
potential to produce. To deal with the problem of po-
tential excess demand, the CEA recommends a 10 per
cent surcharge on corporate and individual income
taxes, effective January 1 for corporations and April 1
for individuals. The CEA warns that in the absence
of fiscal restraint, the economy will be subject to ser-
ious inflationary pressures and/or serious financial
stringency.
Errors in past national economic plans and the pros-
pects of success for future plans depend crucially on
information regarding three areas of economic knowl-
edge. One concerns the quantitative effect of fiscal
and monetary actions on total demand; a second, the
timing of the effects of fiscal and monetary actions on
total demand; and a third, the trade.offbetween prices
and real output.
I. Stabilization Policy and Economic
Performance in 1967
As background for the analysis of the national eco-
~ term, “economic plan”, follows from the idea that given
certain information about the structure of the economy and
assumptions about the course of monetary actions, total de-
mand can be controlled at the margin by fiscal actions. Use of
the term, “economic plan,” does not mean to imply that a1~
location of the nation’s output to particular sectors is planned.
nomic plan for 1968, economic conditions and stabiliza-
tion policies in 1967 are reviewed. The CEA’s econom-
ic plan of a year ago is compared with the outcome.
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On balance, economic activity advanced in 1967 but
at a much slower rate than in recent years. The year’s
growth pattern consisted of a sluggish first half fol.
lowed by a sharp acceleration in the second half. The
slowdown in the first half was dominated by a large
inventory adjustment which more than offset the in-
crease in final demand, whereas the second half was
influenced primarily by a sharp turn-around in the
rate of inventory accumulation, even though final de-
mand slowed.
Superficially, the CEA’s plan for 1967 appears to
have come very close to being realized, although the
pattern during the year was more uneven than antici-
pated. The advance of activity in the first half was
much slower than planned, while that of the second
half was apparently faster than planned. In retrospect,
the first-half slowdown was clearly underestimated by
the CEA, but the second half surge was apparently
misgauged because the major restraining fiscal actions
planned were not implemented.
In retrospect, it appears that the CEA forecast the
composition of GNP very accurately (Table I). In
terms of absolute error the major exception was con-
Tablro I
FORECAST AND ACTUAL GNP, CALENDAR 1967
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Page 6sumption, which was lower than forecast. The low
estimate occurred even though the recommended tax
surcharge was not implemented. A proper appraisal of
the CEA forecast should be based on a comparison of
its forecast, without a tax surcharge, with the actual
outcome. The surcharge, as originally proposed, was
designed to produce about $3 billion in revenue; thus
it could probably be assumed that the CEA was fore-
casting a GNP in the $790 to $793 billion range in the
absence of the surcharge. On this basis, the CEA’s
GNPforecast was inerror by $5 to $8 billion.
A forecast of GNP is incomplete unless it is accom-
panied by an estimate of how the increase translates
into real product and prices. The CEA’s plan for 1967
included a4per cent increase in real product and a
2.5 per cent advance in prices. The record for the year
indicates a 3.8 per cent growth in real product and a
3.2per cent rise in prices.
The comparison of plan with outcome regarding
output and prices is blurred by the fact that the
CEA’s plan assumed a tax increase. The CEA under-
estimated the extent to which inflationary forces were
operating in 1967. A larger portion of the 1967 increase
in GNP went into prices than in any other year since
1958.
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In January 1967 the CEA presented its budget pro-
gram for the year. A key part of that program was
the proposed surcharge on income taxes to take effect
on July 1, The budget plan called for a $4 billion def-
icit in the national income accounts for calendar 1967.
The actual deficit is currently estimated at $12.6 bil-
lion. A comparison of planned and actual receipts and
expenditures is shown in Table II,
Tab!e II
PLANNED AND ACTUAL NIA BUDGET, CALENDAR 1967
Bi’l apr of Dolor
Budget Pier Actua’ Error
Rcccipts 158,5 151.5 7.0
E,.pcr’drturon 162 5 164 1 - 1.6
Surp’ns (—i—). a’ deficit () to 12.6
The chiefreason for error in the budget plan for last
year was the failure to estimate receipts accurately;
actual expenditures exceeded the forecast by only $1.6
billion. The shortfall of receipts can be explained by
two factors: (1) the failure of Congress to take action
on the surcharge, and (2) the slower-than-expected
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rise in economic activity, especially in the first half.
The 1967 experience suggests the desirability of the
CEA presenting publicly, when relevant, several fore-
casts based on alternative sets of assumptions. For
example, in 1967 it would have been informative if the
CEA had presented in detail two forecasts, one assum-
ing the tax surcharge and the other not. In this way
Congress and the public would have been better able
to assess the consequences of Congressional action or
inaction.
The year 1967 was a year of moderate growth, de-
spite fiscal actions that were more expansionary than
planned. Monetary actions were very restrictive in late
1966 and probably affected economic expansion in
early 1967, but during 1967 monetary expansion was
probably more rapid than anticipated. The 1967 CEA
report implied that monetary restraint would be re-
quired if fiscal restraint, through the surcharge, was
not forthcoming. This policy alternative was not
placed into operation. Even though the surcharge was
not enacted, causing fiscal actions to be more expan-
sionarythan planned, monetary actions remained stim-
ulative through December 1967.
Despite the continuing stimulus from fiscal actions
during 1967, economic activity was sluggish in the first
half and ebullient in the second. This experience dem-
onstrates the operation of lags in the economic im-
pact of monetary and fiscal actions. The first-half slow-
down of activity probably reflected the restrictive
monetary actions of 1966, which more than offset the
fiscal stimulus of that period. It was not until the
Page 7In retrospect, the sequence of economic events took
place under such a different set of circumstances than
the CEA anticipated in its forecast, that it is not very
useful to compare their plan with the outcome. It
would seem to be in the public interest to have the
regime of circumstances outlined more explicitly, en-
abling a more enlightened decision-making process
with regard to stabilization policy.
The budget program for fiscal 1969 is presented
within a new format. A new concept of the budget is
presented, which replaces the outmoded and midlead-
ing administrative budget and removes some con-
fusion arising from the use of several budget concepts.
The budget plan of the Federal Government for
fiscal 1969 (year ending June 30, 1969) calls for a def-
icit of $8 billion in the new unified budget.2 Expendi-
tures are scheduled to rise 6 per cent from fiscal 1968
and receipts by 14 per cent. The deficit for fiscal 1968
is estimated at $20 billion.
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Spending authority (i.e., budget authority in the
official parlance of the budget report)
for fiscal 1969 is scheduled to rise by 8.2
per cent, compared with a 2.2 per cent
increase in the previous fiscal year. An
8 per cent increase in authority for de-
fense, international and space is includ-
ed, compared with a 1 per cent increase
in the previous fiscal year. Authority for
domestic programs increases about 9 per
cent, up sharply from the 4 per cent rise
in fiscal 1968.
777/77/71:
Although spending authority is sched-
uled to rise more rapidly in fiscal 1969
than in fiscal 1968, expenditure plans in-
dicate a marked slowdown in the rate of
increase. The fiscal 1969 budget plans a
6 per cent rise of total spending, consist-
2Sir,ce the budget plan is always prepared on
a fiscal year basis, i.e., for the year ending on
June 30, the budget plan is summarized on
this basis. The following section on the eco-
nomic impact of the budget focuses on calen-
dar 1968. Budget plans for the calendar year
have to be pieced together from the budget
report and theCEA report.
ing of 4 per cent for defense, international and space,
and 8 per cent for domestic programs. Increases in
spending for these programs are estimated at 9 and 14
per cent, respectively, infiscal 1968.
Estimates of defense spending for fiscal 1969 imply
a leveling off in defense purchases. When adjusted
for changes in prices, the increase translates into little
change in real terms. Any expansion in U. S. military
commitments would require supplemental appropria-
tions not included in the budget.
The increase in domestic spending primarily reflects
programs that have already been legislated. Increased
social security benefits are scheduled for March and a
pay raise for Government employees for July. Expen-
ditures for education, housing, etc., however, are
scheduled to be cutback by 4 per cent.
The discrepancy between changes in budget author-
ity and expenditures indicates that the pool of author-
ized and spendable funds is being drawn down sub-
stantially in fiscal 1988, but is scheduled to be built
up in fiscal 1969.
Federal receipts are estimated to rise sharply in






second half of 1967 that the economy reflected the
combined stimulus of fiscal and monetary actions.
II. Budget Program for 1968-69
Federal Government Expenditures
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Page 8porate and individual income taxes, effective January
1 for corporations and April 1 for individuals. The
surcharge would provide an estimated $9.8 billion in
fiscal 1969.
Other features of the tax program include expansion
of the base for social security taxes in calendar 1968,
an increase in social security tax rates on January 1,
1989, and extension of excise tax rates on telephone
service and automobiles. The increase in the social
security taxes will add $3.3 billion to revenue. Exten-
sion of excise rates, which under existing laws are
scheduled for reduction on April 1, will prevent the
loss of $2.7 billion.
Changes in tax laws are estimated to add $10.8
billion in revenue in fiscal 1969. The remaining $11.5
billion of the increase is expected from growth in the
economy.
III. Federal Budget Actions and the
Economic Outlook for 1968
Proposed budget actions for the eighteen-month
period ending June 30, 1989, rest on the premise that
in the absence of actions to raise tax rates or restrain
monetary growth, federal budget actions would be
overly stimulative in relation to present and expected
strength of private demand relative to productive ca-
pacity. The budget program will probably have little
effect on the rate of economic expansion early in cal-
endar 1968, since the effect of most tax actions would
not be felt by consumers until spring. Instead, the
program apparently aims at achieving a more mod-
erate expansion in the secondhalf of 1968.
The CEA’s forecast for 1968 has built into it a 3,4
Federal Budget Influence
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per cent increase in prices. This increase, if realized,
would be the largest year-to-year change since 1957.
Compared with the experience of other periods since
1965 (when the economy reached full employment),
the projected increase in prices appears to be roughly
consistent with the 7.7 per cent forecast increase in
total demand (see Table III). There is no indication
Tab c. III
SPENDING, OUTPUT, AND PRICES
Arr.vci Roten Of Change
(Per ~entl
Told Real
Period rpending oufput~ Prices’
1964. IV to 1966; I n.... 99 7.7 2.1
1966- Ito 1966. IV 6.7 3.3 3.3
1966, IV to 1967. II ..... 34 1.1 2.3




in the CEA report, however, as to whether this com-
bination of output growth and price increase is the
most desirable of the attainable alternatives. It would
be of great help to the policymakers if the CEA had
provided their alternative estimates of real product
growth and inflation rates for different target levels of
total demand. In this way Congress and the public
would be in a better position to judge whether the
CEA’s economic plan is the best attainable under the
circumstances. Little is known about the trade-off be-
tween output and prices, yet the public would be
benefited if it knew the CEA’s assumptions about this
trade-off.3
Economic activity is rising rapidly, fueled by the
lagged effects of a large fiscal stimulus and very rapid
monetary expansion in 1967. The deficit in the high-
employment budget was estimated at $10 billion in
the fourth quarter, compared with a $5 billion deficit
a year earlier. The nation’s money supply rose 7 per
cent from December 1966 to December 1967, the fast-
est rate fora twelve-month period since World War II.
31t has been suggested that there is both a short-run and long-
tim trade-off between output and prices. For an attempt to
estimate these trade-offs for several countries, see Michael
Keran, “The Effect of Total Demand on Real Output,” Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (July 1966), pp. 7-12.
Page 9These past policy actions are currently working to
overheat the economy. Since policy actions affect the
economy with a lag, there is perhaps little that can be
done to restrain inflationary forces effectively in the
first half of 1968. To avoid the cumulation of these
inflationary forces, however, restrictive actions should
be taken promptly. The fiscal program was supposed-
ly designed for thispurpose.
The question remains whether the proposed actions
are sufficient to successfully combat inflation. Relevant
in answering such a question is the expected course of
monetary actions. With more restrictive fiscal actions
it would be easier to restrain monetary growth, and,
although it remains silent on this point, it is likely that
the CEA expects slower monetary growth. If monetary
actions continue to be expansionary, any restrictive
effects flowing from the fiscal program may be negat-
ed. If monetary growth is reduced, the combined fiscal
and monetary program canprobablybe madeeffective.
The CEA does not spell out the requirements for
monetary action in its economic plan, but the success
of the program depends crucially on monetary growth.
In addition, the possible consequences of Congress-
ional inaction on the surcharge deserve a thorough
examination.
Answers to such questions as posed above require
quantitative estimates of the impact of fiscal and mon-
etary actions. Such estimates require information
about the structure of the economy. There is little
general agreement among economists about this struc-
ture, yet an implied structure of the economy under-
liesthe CEA’s economic plan. Since the CEA does not
make its economic model available to the public, the
results of other studies have to be used to examine in
greater detail the implications of the budget plan for
economic activity in 1968.
The CEA emphasizes that failure to enact the sur-
charge would leave the entire burden of stabilization
to the Federal Reserve. More properly, it mightbe said
that the burden of stabilization, assuming the Federal
Reserve restricts bank credit to the rate consistent with
desired growth in total demand, will be greatest on
those who rely most heavily on credit, especially long-
term credit. The consequences will be a severe strain
on financial markets with possible disruptive effects
on the housing sector. The CEA’s statements are quali-
tative; no quantitative estimates of the effects of this
policy alternative are given.
Econometric studies have been conducted over the
years, however, which shed light on this trade-off
between fiscal and monetary actions. Table IV pro-
vides some crude estimates of the effects of the pro-
posed tax surcharge, as obtained from one such model.4
It should be emphasized that other models would give
different results.
These estimates are prepared on the assumption that
GNP totals the same $846 billion as the CEA projects
in its report, and that the Government’s spendingplans
will be realized. Given these assumptions, two sets of
values are calculated—one showing the results with
the surcharge, and the other the results without the
surcharge. The difference between these two sets of
values is shown in Table IV.
Tabie IV
EFFECT OF PROPOSED TAX SURCHARGE
Effect of 1 D’/e Surcharge
Eco’omic MagrDude (Compared with no Surcharge)
High-pawcred rnoi-..y Creole, by $7.8 bilIion
Lorg.term government bond rote . tower by 56 bank pointi
Irven’rv.crt Oreater by 50.7 billion
t’iIA dc.frcr’ -.. . ..- Smolier by $7.2 ~irIior
Federal dnbl in ha’ds of pubic lower by $15.0 bilior
If the surcharge is not pass ci, a larger defIcit ‘~ill
have to be financed than otherwise. Also, monetary
actions will have to be modified accordingly to achieve
the GNP target It is estimated that the proposed tax
surcharge is the equivalent of $7.8 billion in monetary
action as measured by the change in high-powered
money, i.e., bank reserves and public holdings of
currency.5 Thus, without the surcharge, the rate of
monetary growth would have to be cut substantially
to achieve the GNP target of $846billion.
Interest rates would be 56 basis points higher with-
out the surcharge than with it, and as a result invest-
ment would be about $0.7 billion less. The item most
affected by the tax situation is the public’s holding of
Government debt, which would be greater by $15
billion if no action is taken on the surcharge.
These estimates are crude, and are meant to be
illustrative ratherthan indicative of actual magnitudes.
4
Based on estimates from a model similar to that presented by
Professor Carl Christ before the December 1966 meetings of
the American Economic Association. A detailed derivation of
these estimates, along with estimates from alternative models,
is provided in a memorandum entitled, “Policy Mix and the
1968 Economic Report,” available on request from the Re-
search Department of this Bank.
1
See Leonall C. Andersen, “Three Approaches to Money Stock
Determination,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review
(October 1967), pp. 6-13, for a description of this measure.
Page 10Nevertheless, they are offered to demonstrate the in-
terdependence of fiscal and monetary actions. Although
existing estimates are approximate, they would seem
to be more meaningful than intuitive judgment. If the
consequences of inaction on the surcharge are not
spelled out clearly, policymakers are not being suffi-
ciently equipped with information uponwhich tomake
intelligent decisions.
IV. Conclusion
The CEA’s report has reflected increasing economic
sophistication in recent years with regard to the for-
mulation of stabilization policy. Many areas of eco-
nomic knowledge are still in a sorry state, and the
CEA continues to prepare its analysis on the basis of
fiscal policy, largely ignoring monetary effects. Yet,
there is little question but that the formulation of eco-
nomic policy has improved over the years. One of the
great problems that remains is the formation and im-
The new unified budget is introduced as a replacement
for other outmoded measures. To gain an understanding
of the new budget, the old budgetconcepts are summarized
along with the new.
Administrative Budget
Prior to the presentation of the fiscal 1969 budget, the
administrative budget was the basic planning document of
the Federal Government. This measure of the budget in-
cluded receipts and expenditures of funds owned by the
Government, excluding funds held in trust.
Cash Budget
The cash budget measures the flow of transactions be-
tween the Federal Government and the rest of the econ-
omy. In addition to the activities included in the adminis-
plementation of policy when the economy is operating
at high employment. According to Professor Walter
Heller, former chairman ofthe CEA~
the margin for error diminishes as the economy
reaches the treasured but treacherous area of full
employment. Big doses of expansionary medicine
were easy—and safe—to recommend in the face of a
$50 billion gap and a hesitant Congress. But at full
employment, targets have to be defined more sharply,
tolerances are smaller, the line between expansion
and inflation becomes thinner. So in a full employ-
ment world the economic dosage has to be much more
carefully controlled, the premium on quantitative
scientific knowledge becomes far greater, and the
premium on speed in our fiscal machinery also rises.6
6Walter W. Heller, New Dimensions of Political Economy
(Cambridgez Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 69-70.
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trative budget, receipts and expenditures of the trust funds
and Government-sponsored agencies are included. Surplus-
es or deficits in the cash budget indicate changes in cash
borrowing fromthe public and/or changes in the Treasury’s
cash balance.
Unified Budget
The new budget is a unified comprehensive statement
of the Government’s financial plan, replacing the adminis-
trative budget as the Government’s basic planning docu-
ment. The unified budget, as first presented, resembles
most closely the cash budget, with the major difference
being the treatment of sales of participation certificates in
Government-owned financial assets. The cash budget in-
cludes such sales as an offset to expenditures, whereas in
the unified budget such sales are treated as borrowing.
APPENDIX
Measures of the Budget
Page 11After accounting procedures are revised, receipts and ex-
penditures in the unified budget will be presented on an
accrual basis, rather than on a cash basis.
National Income Accounts Budget
The national income accounts budget summarizes the
receipts and expenditures of the FederalGovernment sector
as an integrated part of the recorded activities (i.e., the
national income accounts) of all sectors of the economy.
Primary differences between the national income accounts
budget and the unified budget (and the cash budget) are
(1) on the expenditure side, spending is recorded when
delivery is made to the Government, and purchases and
sales of existing real and financial assets are excluded, and
(2) on the receipts side, taxes are in large measure recorded
when the tax liability is incurred,
High-Employment Budget
The high-employment budget is an estimate of the
national income accounts budget which would prevail at a
specified constant rate of resource use, By eliminating the
major built-in stabilizer effects (i.e., the effect of changing
levels of economic activity on Government receipts and ex-
penditures), the high-employment budget indicates the
economic impact of changes in tax laws and legal provi-
sions for expenditures.
Budget Authority
Budget authority is legislation by congress permitting a
Government agency or department to commit or obligate
the Government to pay out money either in the form of
expenditures or loans. Congress does not vote on expend-
itures; it determines budget authority. Before funds can
be spent or loaned, an agency must submit and have
approved by the Bureau of the Budget an apportionment
request. This determines the rateat which budget authority
can be used. An agency usually incurs obligations, i.e.,
commits itself to spend or loan money, after apportionment
by the Bureau of the Budget.
Incurring obligations does not necessarily mean immedi-
ate disbursement of funds. Trends in budget authority,
however, are indicative of trends in expenditures, although
frequently budget authority and expenditures diverge
sharply on a year-to-year basis.
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